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Abstract 
While scientific understanding concerning the role of biological pathogenic agents in the transmission of 
communicable diseases has increased markedly in recent decades, the possibility of a psychological pathogenic 
agent that underlies the transmission of a number of key global public health concerns has largely been 
overlooked. The present paper identifies inverted hallucinations as a novel category of hallucination that not only 
reflect a key public health concern in their own right, but also appear to play an active role in the gradual 
transmission of diseases traditionally deemed to be non-communicable, such as mental health problems, obesity, 
and social media addiction. More specifically, the present paper delineates the assumptions and indicative 
empirical support underlying inverted hallucination theory as well as the characteristic features, functional 
consequences, prevalence, communicability, and co-occurrence of inverted hallucinations in the general 
population. Inverted hallucinations appear to be both globally prevalent and communicable, and are estimated to 
affect the average person on at least an occasional basis. Inverted hallucinations cause individuals to succumb to 
states of mind wandering that distorts their perception of what is happening in the present moment and increases 
their susceptibility to other deleterious health conditions. Moreover, inverted hallucinations appear to reflect a 
key overlooked public health need that not only stunt human potential and quality of life but also pose a risk to 
the wellbeing of the population globally.  
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Introduction 
Recent scientific focus on ancient contemplative 
techniques such as mindfulness has indicated a range 
of benefits associated with present moment 
awareness, including improvements in (for example) 
somatic health, mental health, psychosocial 
functioning, job performance, and work and life 
satisfaction. In the traditional and contemporary 
contemplative literature, as well as in the 
contemporary academic literature, the opposite 
condition to mindfulness is generally accepted to be 
‘mindlessness’, which refers to a lack of conscious 
awareness of the present moment. According to 
Langer, whose study of mindlessness and 
mindfulness was more from a modern psychological 
rather than traditional contemplative perspective, 
mindlessness involves an individual operating “much 
like a robot; thoughts, emotions, and behaviors … are 
determined by ‘programmed’ routines based on 
distinctions and associations learned in the past” 
(Bodner & Langer, 2001, p. 1). Langer also asserted 
that mindlessness restricts people to a repetitive 
unelaborated approach to life, and stunts their 
creativity and overall potential: “Mindlessness as it 
diminishes our self-image, narrows our choices, and 
weds us to single-minded attitudes, has a lot to do 
with this wasted potential” (Langer, 1989, p. 55). It is 
generally accepted, at least in broad terms, that 
mindfulness and mindlessness reflect opposing 
constructs and that it would be uncommon or even 
implausible for a high level of mindfulness and a high 
level of mindlessness to occur in the same individual 
concurrently (this excludes a very small minority of 
highly advanced esoteric meditation practitioners – 
such as those belonging to ‘crazy wisdom’ 
contemplative traditions – who are purported to 
exhibit contemplative proficiency through being 
“mindfully mindless”; Trungpa, 2003).  
 
Some of the present authors previously described 
mindlessness as a lack of moment-to-moment 
awareness in which the mind is preoccupied with 
future (and therefore fantasised) conjectures or past 
(and therefore bygone) occurrences (Shonin, Van 
Gordon, & Griffiths, 2014). The present authors also 
previously identified a novel form of hallucination, 
called an inverted hallucination, which appears to be 
intrinsically linked to mindlessness. This is based on 
the rationale that if a hallucination refers to ‘the 
perceiving of that which is not’, then mindlessness 
reflects a form of ‘inverted hallucination’, due to it 
constituting the ‘non-perceiving of that which is’ 
(Shonin et al., 2014). Experiencing an inverted 
hallucination implies that a person is not fully (or 
even partially) aware of their psychological and 
sensory experiences as they unfold in the present 
moment. Given the past has expired and the future 
never materialises (i.e. because when the so-called 
future arrives it is the present), life can only be fully 
embraced and experienced in the present moment 
(Van Gordon, Shonin, & Garcia-Campayo, 2017a). 
Therefore, if a person suffers from inverted 
hallucinations, it implies that they are experiencing a 
distorted perception of reality and ‘missing out on 
their life’. 
While there has been significant scientific interest in 
recent decades into the benefits of mindfulness, the 
wider public health and psychosocial impact caused 
by inverted hallucinations appears to have been 
overlooked. This paper seeks to address this 
imbalance by critically delineating the assumptions 
and indicative empirical support for inverted 
hallucination theory as well as the characteristic 
behaviours, functional consequences, prevalence, 
communicability, and co-occurrence of inverted 
hallucinations in the general population. 
Characteristic Behaviours  
Specific examples of behaviours likely to be 
indicative of inverted hallucination are as follows: 
• Unconscious or partially conscious use of a 
mobile phone or social media, including in 
situations in which such usage poses a risk to 
the individual’s (or to other people’s) health 
(e.g., using a mobile phone when crossing the 
road, engaging with social media excessively 
such that it becomes addictive, etc.)  
• Eating in a mode more akin to ‘feeding’ and 
that involves not fully tasting and masticating 
food and/or being preoccupied with what 
should be eaten next. 
• Being inconsiderate or completely oblivious 
regarding the wellbeing and/or personal space 
of others (e.g., not using headphones or 
Journal of Concurrent Disorders    Vo1. 1 No. 2, 2019 
 
 
 
59 
 
disabling the loud speaker when using video-
networking applications [Messenger, Line, 
Kik, WhatsApp, etc.] on an internet-enabled 
device when in a public area, being 
boisterous, base or excessively loud, etc.) 
• Habitually rushing to arrive somewhere (e.g., 
work) and then rushing to return home 
without particularly noticing the journey (and 
without there necessarily being a valid reason 
for such rushing). 
• Engaging in (so-called) conversation with 
another person or persons but without fully or 
even partially listening to them (i.e., yet not 
consciously choosing not to listen). 
More general examples of behaviours likely to be 
indicative of inverted hallucinations are as follows: 
• Not being aware of one’s bodily posture or the 
consistency and movement of one’s breath for 
the majority part of the day (excluding when 
asleep). 
• Not being aware of one’s ‘mental posture’ or 
the consistency and movement of one’s mind 
for the majority part of the day (excluding 
when asleep). 
• Habitually opting to remain occupied in place 
of occasionally spending meaningful time 
alone or in contemplative awareness (e.g., 
excessive engagement with technology or the 
internet, excessive engagement in 
meaningless conversation, etc.). 
Functional Consequences 
Suffering from inverted hallucinations implies a 
partial or complete lack of awareness of direct 
experience. Direct experience in this sense refers to 
the immediate cognisance of sensory and 
psychological processes at the point that they unfold 
in the present moment. According to the principles 
underlying inverted hallucination theory, not being 
aware of direct experiences blunts an individual’s 
awareness of the present moment and gives rise to 
maladaptive conceptual layers or ‘mental noise’ that 
distorts their perception of reality (Shonin & Van 
Gordon, 2013). These superfluous psychological and 
affective processes draw people into a state of mind 
wandering, which some contemplative adepts have 
likened to living as a walking corpse (Shonin, Van 
Gordon, & Griffiths, 2015). Non-volitional thought 
rumination along with other psychological processes 
associated with mind wandering is a key component 
of an inverted hallucination, and is known to increase 
susceptibility to mental health problems, problematic 
behaviours, and exhaustion more generally 
(Compare, Zarbo, Shonin, Van Gordon, & Marconi, 
2014; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 
1993; Watkins, 2008). For example, mind wandering 
is positively associated with unhappiness 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and has been 
identified as a marker for depressive thinking 
(Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbury, & Obonsawin, 
2007). Conversely, reduced mind wandering has been 
shown to mediate the intervention effects of 
mindfulness on cognitive performance (e.g., reading 
comprehension and working memory; Mrazek, 
Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013). 
 
Prevalence 
Using the widely administered Mindful Attention and 
Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) as 
an example (which has a total score range of 1-6 and 
where high scores are claimed to indicate greater 
levels of mindfulness), scores in both general 
population and clinical samples of individuals naive 
to mindfulness are typically in the order of 60-75% of 
scale maximum (i.e., 3.80 – 4.45 [SD = 0.63-0.85]; 
e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Carlson & Brown, 2005; 
MacKillop & Anderson, 2007; Van Gordon, Shonin, 
Sumich, Sundin, & Griffiths, 2014). Taking into 
account findings from studies that have shown 
mindfulness – as measured using the MAAS – and 
mind-wandering (i.e., a key attribute of mindlessness) 
to be construct opposites (Mrazek, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2012), in addition to assessing mindfulness 
each of the MAAS items can equally be considered to 
serve as a gauge of mindlessness. This is consistent 
with the approach adopted by Bodner and Langer 
(2001), who actually named their scale the 
‘Mindfulness/Mindlessness Scale’. Accordingly, a 
response of 6 [almost never] to any of MAAS’s 15 
items (e.g., Item 3 = I find it difficult to stay focused 
on what’s happening in the present, Item 10 = I do 
jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of 
what I'm doing) indicates a greater level of mindful 
behaviour, while a response of 1 [almost always] 
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indicates a greater level of mindless behaviour. The 
aforementioned typical MAAS score of 3.80-4.45 
therefore implies that on average, people experience 
an inverted hallucination on an occasional basis (i.e., 
‘somewhat infrequently’ – which we would argue is 
synonymous with occasionally or rather occasionally 
– is the frequency descriptor that corresponds to a 
score of 3.80-4.45 on the MAAS).  
However, even this is likely to reflect a gross 
underestimation of the extent of inverted 
hallucinations in the global population because there 
is ongoing scholarly debate relating to whether 
mindfulness scales – including the MAAS – 
accurately tap into an authentic Buddhist 
conceptualisation of mindfulness, or whether they 
assess a watered-down Westernized version of 
mindfulness (sometimes referred to as 
McMindfulness; Purser, 2015). Furthermore, there 
likewise exist entirely different conceptual 
approaches towards operationalising and measuring 
mindfulness, such that proponents of (for example) 
second-generation mindfulness-based interventions 
(that attempt to employ a more Buddhist congruent 
practice model of mindfulness) would argue that 
some mindfulness scales (including the MAAS) 
employ flawed assumptions relating to mindfulness 
(Van Gordon, Shonin, & Griffiths, 2015). Moreover, 
validation studies of mindfulness assessment scales 
have not always been able to identify differences in 
mindfulness levels between novice and advanced 
meditators, which is likewise incongruent with 
traditional Buddhist practice principles (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003; McKillop & Anderson, 2007). 
Thus, even individuals that might not be diagnosed 
with a mental illness using widely-employed 
diagnostic criteria could still be suffering from an 
inverted hallucination (Shonin et al., 2014). Indeed, a 
popular Buddhist position is that the symptoms of 
inverted hallucinations are currently highly prevalent 
and are becoming increasingly more so (Huang Po, 
1982). This is in line with projections made by 
Buddhist adepts thousands of years ago that during 
the present period of time (i.e., that is relatively 
materialistic and technology-driven), levels of self- 
and introspective-awareness would rapidly diminish 
(Marra, 1998). 
  
Communicability 
In recent decades, there has been a broadening of 
focus within public health from its traditional 
emphasis on communicable diseases to seeking to 
assess and address the health needs associated with 
non-communicable diseases, such as obesity and 
mental illness. However, the extent to which some 
apparently non-communicable diseases should be 
considered entirely non-communicable warrants 
closer inspection. Taking overweight and obesity as 
an example, levels amongst young people aged 5-19 
years increased from 4% in 1975 to 18% in 2016 
(World Health Organization, 2018). Such health 
problems are obviously not understood to be 
transmitted through acute exposure to biological 
pathogenic agents, yet this does not preclude the 
possibility of gradual transmission involving 
‘psychological pathogenic agents’, of which the 
present authors would argue inverted hallucinations 
reflect a key example. Compared to conventional 
forms of communicable diseases, inverted 
hallucinations are likely to transmit in a slower and 
less detectable manner, whereby processes such as 
ontological addiction (see below) and social 
conditioning constitute important aspects of the 
transmission pathway. Nevertheless, these 
psychological processes result in the spread and 
intensification of inverted hallucinations along with 
other health problems that seem to be associated with 
not living mindfully (e.g., social media addiction, 
obesity, physical inactivity, gambling addiction, and 
mental health problems).  
Although the transmission rate of inverted 
hallucinations appears to be relatively gradual, the 
global prevalence increases in diseases that seem to 
stem from inverted hallucinations – such as the 
aforementioned spread of obesity from 1 in 25 to 
almost 1 in 5 people within just a 30-year period – 
suggest that the incidence rate of such ‘non-
communicable’ diseases can still be alarming (Parikh 
et al., 2007). Indeed, compared to conventional forms 
of communicable disease, public health concerns 
such as obesity and mental health problems tend to be 
significantly more global in scope and thus exert a 
much greater level of disease burden.  
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A core principle of contemplative practice is to have 
ample contact with individuals, including a teacher, 
that have virtuous characteristics and who attempt to 
apply contemplative principles in daily life (Nhat 
Hanh, 1999). The reason for this is that it is easy for 
individuals who frequently experience inverted 
hallucinations to be distracted or negatively 
influenced by those who likewise suffer from chronic 
inverted hallucinations. In other words, inverted 
hallucination theory asserts that the condition can be 
gradually contracted and intensified through exposure 
to others experiencing inverted hallucinations, 
particularly so when lacking the support of a teacher 
and/or community that advocates contemplative 
practice aimed at eradicating such a blunted 
perception of reality (Van Gordon, Shonin, & 
Griffiths, 2017b).  
 
Co-occurrence 
It is logical to assume that inverted hallucinations can 
co-occur with all of the symptoms and health 
problems for which mindfulness has been shown to 
be efficacious. For example, given that mindfulness is 
known to reduce levels of stress, anxiety, or 
depression, then it can be assumed that a greater 
severity of inverted hallucination was present at the 
pre- versus post-treatment phase. This is consistent 
with the fact that present moment awareness is 
inversely associated with a range of psychopathology 
risk factors, including (for example), thought 
rumination, perceived life stress, and negative 
emotions (Mesmer-Magnus, Manapraganda, 
Viswesvaran, & Allen, 2017; Smallwood et al., 
2007). It is also consistent with Bodner and Langer’s 
(2001) validation study of the 
Mindfulness/Mindlessness Scale, in which (i) high 
scores (i.e., greater levels of mindfulness) were 
associated with the capacity to view situations from 
multiple perspectives, liberal thinking style, openness 
to experience, need for cognition, and general 
cognitive ability, and (ii) low scores (i.e., greater 
levels of mindlessness) were associated with the need 
for structure.  
 
Inverted hallucinations are also likely to co-occur 
with ontological addiction, which arises when an 
individual becomes attached or addicted to their 
beliefs concerning how they think they exist. 
Ontological addiction has also been referred to as 
‘self-addiction’ and is defined as “the unwillingness 
to relinquish an erroneous and deep-rooted belief in 
an inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ as well as the 
‘impaired functionality’ that arises from such a 
belief” (Van Gordon et al., 2018, p.892). According 
to ontological addiction theory (OAT), self-addiction 
limits psychosocial functioning because instead of an 
open and encompassing awareness of what is 
unfolding in the wider present moment, an inwardly 
focussed mind becomes pre-occupied with ego-
driven concepts, schemes, and behaviours that impair 
mindful awareness (Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 
2016). For example, according to Van Gordon et al. 
(2018), “rather than simply eating in order to eat or 
working in order to work … the individual suffering 
from ontological addiction pursues activities and 
goals with only a superficial and/or self-orientated 
regard for the people and ‘peripheral’ phenomena 
they interact with” (p. 893). Therefore, due to 
erroneously believing and perceiving that the ‘I’ 
exists inherently and independently (i.e., rather than 
understanding that it exists relatively and only in 
dependence on all other phenomena), ontological 
addiction could even be considered a subtle form of 
inverted hallucination in its own right as well as a 
discrete co-occurring condition.  
 
Conclusions 
Inverted hallucination theory asserts that due to not 
perceiving that which is occurring in the present 
moment, individuals succumb to states of mind 
wandering that blunts their awareness of what is 
happening here and now. In line with empirically 
established associations between low-levels of 
present moment awareness and risk factors for a range 
of negative health outcomes, inverted hallucinations 
are deemed to be both a determinant and common co-
occurring condition in respect of non-communicable 
public health concerns such as mental illness, obesity, 
and problematic leisure time activities (e.g., addiction 
to social media, computer games and/or gambling). 
Furthermore, the inverted hallucination condition is 
not only posited to reflect a prevalent public health 
need in its own capacity, but is also asserted to be 
communicable. Social conditioning appears to be a 
key transmission pathway that is augmented by a 
general lack of awareness in terms of what constitutes 
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authentic contemplative practice, as well as the value 
of integrating contemplative principles into daily life 
contexts. Indeed, while there has been a marked 
growth of interest into mindfulness in recent decades, 
a concern of the present authors is that, in many 
instances, people have actually been taught a highly 
superficial form of contemplative practice, known as 
McMindfulness. In essence, inverted hallucinations 
appear to reflect a key overlooked communicable 
public health need that not only stunt human potential 
but also pose a risk to the wellbeing of the population 
globally. 
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